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Message-ID: <aMNVoSM7PauOrCPF@mail.hallyn.com>
Date: Thu, 11 Sep 2025 18:05:05 -0500
From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>
To: Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
Cc: Christian Göttsche <cgoettsche@...tendoof.de>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Christian Göttsche <cgzones@...glemail.com>,
Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, selinux@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] pid: use ns_capable_noaudit() when determining net
sysctl permissions
On Thu, Sep 11, 2025 at 04:46:20PM -0400, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Sep 10, 2025 =?UTF-8?q?Christian=20G=C3=B6ttsche?= <cgoettsche@...tendoof.de> wrote:
> >
> > The capability check should not be audited since it is only being used
> > to determine the inode permissions. A failed check does not indicate a
> > violation of security policy but, when an LSM is enabled, a denial audit
> > message was being generated.
> >
> > The denial audit message can either lead to the capability being
> > unnecessarily allowed in a security policy, or being silenced potentially
> > masking a legitimate capability check at a later point in time.
> >
> > Similar to commit d6169b0206db ("net: Use ns_capable_noaudit() when
> > determining net sysctl permissions")
> >
> > Fixes: 7863dcc72d0f ("pid: allow pid_max to be set per pid namespace")
> > CC: Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>
> > CC: linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
> > CC: selinux@...r.kernel.org
> > Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@...glemail.com>
> > ---
> > kernel/pid.c | 2 +-
> > 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
Thanks.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com>
I'll queue this up in the capability tree, unless Christian wanted
it in his.
-serge
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